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Abstract
Each year the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development produces a 
report on foreign direct investment (FDI). This report highlights trends on FDI, and 
identifies the world’s largest transnational corporation (TNC). Prominent among the 
largest TNS are telecommunication companies such as Vodafone and Telefónica. 
Less obvious due to its ‘diversified’ description is Hutchison Whampoa, a large 
conglomerate with a long history of an active presence in the telecommunications 
industry. This paper charts the history of this involvement before focusing on whether 
its recent investment in third-generation (3G) licences will be as successful as 
previous its ones. Through analysing the 3G investments that it has made, this paper 
argues that Hutchison Whampoa is unlikely to enjoy the same success with these 3G 
investments as it has in the past with Orange and its Indian operations
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1Third time lucky? An Exploration of Hutchison Whampoa’s 
Involvement in the Mobile Telecommunications Industry 
1. Introduction 
Given the size and global nature of the telecommunications industry, it is no surprise 
that several telecommunications companies can be found listed among the 100 largest 




th) (UNCTAD, 2010). However, a closer examination of the list 
reveals another significant player in the global telecommunications industry, namely 
Hutchison Whampoa.  
With assets of more than US$70 billion, Hutchison Whampoa is described as 
‘diversified’ and hence is not readily associated with the telecommunications 
industry. Nevertheless, it has had a long, significant and arguably quite successful 
presence in the industry. Since the late 1980s, Hutchison Whampoa has invested in 
several sectors of the industry – mobile, fixed-wire, cable and equipment – and has 
actively managed its investments, expanding into new markets while divesting itself 
of others.
It is the continued presence of Hutchison Whampoa in the telecommunications 
industry that is the focus of this paper. As a diversified company or conglomerate, it is 
reasonable to expect that Hutchison would move capital between different industries 
as it seeks to maximize its returns. Such a strategy would be in keeping with 
conglomerates such as Gulf & Western, Hanson or ITT.
1 In contrast, Hutchison seems 
to be willing to re-invest in the telecommunications sector, perhaps because two of its 
previous investments – in Orange plc in the UK and in the Indian mobile market – 
were highly profitable. Moreover, there does not appear to be any desire on its part to 
narrow its focus to overcome what has been called the ‘diversification discount’.
2
For example, after decades of diversification, ITT narrowed its focus twice. In 1995, 
the company shed many of the subsidiaries accumulated under Harold Geneen in 
order to focus on three areas, before announcing in January 2011 that it would again 
split itself up (Crooks and Thomas, 2011). Hanson also broke itself up, dividing into 
four listed companies (Stonham, 1997a & 1997b). This desire for focus is also evident 
in conglomerates with a narrower focus. For example, Philip Morris separated its 
tobacco business from its confectionary and food businesses in 2001 when it spun off 
Kraft Foods
3, which, in turn, has announced its own separation into two businesses 
(Thomas, Rappeport, Pickford and Lucas, 2011). 
While some conglomerates have broken themselves up, others appear to be thriving in 
a wide range of countries. Financial Times (2011) identifies conglomerates in both 
emerging markets (Hong Kong and Qatar) and developed countries (Germany and 
Japan), while Khanna and Palepu (1999) find them present in Korea, India and 
Turkey. From Chang (2006) it is clear that conglomerates exist throughout Asia. It is 
within this context of not needing to narrow down its focus that the willingness of 
Hutchison Whampoa to invest repeatedly in the telecommunications industry needs to 
be placed. Hutchison Whampoa has continued to invest even though it has found 
2building a third-generation (3G) mobile business from scratch more challenging and 
protracted than anticipated.
4 It has used the proceeds from the sale of Orange and its 
Indian mobile operations to fund this continued investment, and while it has 
(arguably) invested successfully in mobile telecommunications in the past, this does 
not guarantee that it will be able to repeat this feat.  
With this in mind, the remainder of the paper is divided into five sections. A brief 
overview of Hutchison Whampoa is presented in Section 2, and is followed in Section 
3 by an outline of how the company’s presence in the telecommunications industry 
has evolved over time. In Section 4, Hutchison’s presence is explored along three 
dimensions, namely geographical footprint, number of subscribers and financial 
performance. The issues raised in the previous sections are discussed in Section 5, 
with conclusions being drawn in the final section of the paper. 
2. Hutchison Whampoa
Hutchison Whampoa is a Hong Kong-based conglomerate. According to the most 
recent FT Global 500 ranking, it ranks 150
th among the largest companies in the world 
with sales of $26.9 billion and net income of $2.57 billion (Financial Times, 2011). 
The present size and scope of Hutchison Whampoa is the result of diversification and 
significant internationalization. During the period 1995 to 2010, Hutchison 
Whampoa’s revenues grew almost tenfold from HK$35 billion to HK$325.9 billion 
(Hutchison Whampoa, 1997 and 2011a). Profits, however, did not grow to the same 
extent over this period. While Hutchison Whampoa was consistently profitable, 
profits fluctuated between a low of HK$8.7 billion in 1998 to a high of HK$117.3 
billion in 1999 (Hutchison Whampoa, 1999 and 2000). Setting aside the profits 
reported in 1999, which were largely due to the one-off contribution from the sale of 
the company’s stake in Orange, there has been a general increase in the company’s 
profitability.  
As befits a conglomerate, Hutchison Whampoa is engaged in a diverse array of 
industries and its structure can be described as complex. Hutchison Whampoa divides 
its operations into five areas, namely ports and related services, property and hotels, 
retail, telecommunications, and energy, infrastructure, investments and others. These 
activities are organised into a bewildering array of holding companies, subsidiaries 
and joint ventures. Some, but by no means all, of these activities are wholly-owned 
and eight subsidiaries and associated companies are listed on stock exchanges.
5
It is also worth noting that Hutchison Whampoa is itself 49.9 per cent-owned by 
Cheung Kong Holdings, which describes itself as a being the ‘flagship of the Cheung 
Kong Group’ that encompasses Hutchison Whampoa as well as, among others, 
Cheung Kong Infrastructure Holdings Limited, Hutchison Harbour Ring Limited and 
Power Assets Holdings Limited.
6 Some, but not all, of the companies identified as 
being part of the Cheung Kong Group are also part-owned by Hutchison Whampoa.  
Due to the small size of its home market and the nature of the industries in which it 
has invested, Hutchison Whampoa is also highly internationalized. Since 1990, 
UNCTAD has published details of the largest multinational corporations
7 in terms 
both of size (revenues, assets etc.) and the extent to which they are internationalized. 
Hutchison Whampoa entered the list of the largest 100 multinational corporations by 
3assets in 1999 at number 48 (UNCTAD, 2001). The following year, Hutchison 
Whampoa rose to be the 14
th-largest multinational corporation when measured by 
foreign assets (UNCTAD, 2002). In subsequent years, Hutchison Whampoa’s position 
in the rankings fell away, so that in 2008 it was the 25
th-largest multinational 
corporation when measured by foreign assets (UNCTAD, 2010).
3. Hutchison Whampoa’s involvement in the telecommunications industry 
Figure I depicts the current scope of Hutchison Whampoa’s involvement in the 
telecommunications industry. Hutchison’s involvement is undertaken through a series 
of holding companies which have, over the years, experienced significant changes. 
Companies have not only been bought and sold but have also been floated on stock 
exchanges before being bought back by Hutchison Whampoa. These events are 
outlined in Table 1.  
[Insert Figure I about here] 
[Insert Table I about here] 
The manner in which Hutchison’s involvement in the industry has evolved, coupled 
with its propensity to move assets between companies and engage in merger and 
acquisition activities, means that disentangling these developments is not 
straightforward. Each of the holding companies identified on Figure 1 will be 
discussed in turn, beginning with Hutchison Telecommunications Hong Kong Ltd. 
This company can trace its origins back to the 1996 creation of Hutchison 
Telecommunications (Hong Kong) to manage all of Hutchison Whampoa’s 
telecommunication businesses in Hong Kong (Hutchison Whampoa, 1997). At that 
time, these consisted of mobile, fixed-wire and paging services. In 1999, half of the 
fixed-wire and Internet operations in Hong Kong were sold to Global Crossing, with 
the new company being renamed Hutchison Global Crossing (Hutchison Whampoa, 
2000). Parts of the company’s mobile operations were also sold in the same year; a 19 
per cent stake in Hutchison Telephone was sold to NTT DoCoMo with the 
consequence that Hutchison Telecommunications (Hong Kong) held a 55.9 per cent 
stake and Motorola 25.1 per cent (Hutchison Whampoa, 2000). Just a year later, 
however, Hutchison acquired the stake held by Motorola, thereby increasing its 
ownership of Hutchison Telephone to 81 per cent (Hutchison Whampoa, 2001). 
Confusingly, Hutchison Whampoa then states that it owns 74.63 per cent of 
Hutchison Telephone in the 2001 Annual Report without explaining the decrease 
(Hutchison Whampoa, 2002).
In September 2003, Hutchison Whampoa acquired 37 per cent of Vanda, an IT 
company listed on the Hong Kong stock exchange (Hutchison Whampoa, 2004). 
Shortly afterwards, in March 2004, Vanda acquired outright both Hutchison Global 
Crossing and PowerCom Network Hong Kong. With the merger of these three 
businesses, Vanda was renamed Hutchison Global Communication Holdings, with 
Hutchison Whampoa (through Hutchison Telecommunications International Ltd) 
becoming the majority shareholder.
8 In August 2005, Hutchison Telecommunications 
International Ltd (HTIL hereafter) purchased the free float of Hutchison Global 
Crossing (Hutchison Whampoa, 2006: 47). Not only did this de-list Hutchison Global 
Crossing but it also reduced Hutchison Whampoa’s stake in HTIL to 69.1 per cent.
4As a consequence of the aforementioned series of events, Hutchison Whampoa had a 
stake in HTIL, which, in turn, wholly owned Hutchison Global Crossing. In May 
2009, this structure was changed when HTIL divested Hutchison Global Crossing – 
re-listed as Hutchison Telecommunications Hong Kong Holdings – to its shareholders 
(Hutchison Whampoa, 2010a: 48). As a result of this divestment, Hutchison 
Whampoa became a direct shareholder of the company with a 62.6 per cent stake. 
This company provides fixed-wire and mobile telecommunication services within 
Hong Kong and Macau.
Another one of the holding companies identified in Figure I is Hutchison Asia 
Telecommunications Ltd. Until 2010, this was the company known as HTIL and it 
was one of the principal vehicles through which Hutchison Whampoa had invested in 
the telecommunications industry. HTIL was floated in October 2004 as a holding 
company encompassing a disparate set of fixed-wire and mobile assets in eight 
countries: Hong Kong, Israel, India, Macau, Sri Lanka, Ghana, Paraguay and 
Thailand (Hutchison Whampoa, 2005: 48). In other words, neither the Australian nor 
West European mobile operations were included in the assets floated as HTIL. The 
2004 Annual Report states that after the flotation Hutchison Whampoa owned 70 per 
cent of the company. 
The purchase of the remaining free shares of Hutchison Global Crossing Holdings by 
HTIL had the effect of reducing the percentage of the company owned by Hutchison 
Whampoa, as did the sale of a 19.3 per cent strategic stake in HTIL to Orascom 
Telecom (Hutchison Whampoa, 2006: 47). As a result of these actions, Hutchison 
Whampoa’s stake in HTIL fell to 49.8 per cent. In 2007, Hutchison Whampoa 
acquired shares in the open market to once more become the majority shareholder in 
HTIL (Hutchison Whampoa, 2008: 51).  
Subsequent to the flotation of HTIL, the company entered and exited various markets. 
Its operations in Paraguay (2005), Ghana (2008) and Israel (2009) were sold while it 
entered the Indonesian market (2005) and launched services in Vietnam (2009). In 
March 2008, the company sold its base stations to PT Profesional Telekomunikasi for 
US$500 million (Hutchison Telecommunications International Ltd, 2008). After 
leasing back capacity on the base stations, a one-off gain of US$236 million was 
recorded by HTIL. Although this transaction was included in HTIL’s 20-F filing with 
the Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) in May 2008, it was subsequently 
challenged and ultimately amended. The SEC questioned how the sale and lease-back 
was treated in the company’s accounts in August 2008, with the SEC viewing the 
transaction as a finance lease. HTIL re-stated its accounts, filing a new 20-F with the 
SEC in May 2010.
The SEC inquiry coincided with the decision by Hutchison Whampoa to ‘privatize’ 
HTIL. Indeed, the 2009 Annual Report states that HTIL agreed to amend its accounts 
so as not to delay the shareholder vote on its privatization (Hutchison Whampoa, 
2010a: 50). This privatization would see Hutchison Whampoa acquire the outstanding 
stock in HTIL at HK$2.20 per share (Hutchison Whampoa, 2010b). The proposal 
document highlighted two pertinent issues. The first was that the remaining operations 
of HTIL, once those sold in India and Israel and spun off in Hong Kong and Macau 
were taken into account, lacked scale. The second was that none of the remaining 
5operations were among the largest three in their respective markets and although 
Hutchison Whampoa was confident of their long-term potential, achieving this 
potential would require investment in the short/medium term.  
When coupled with the fall in the market capitalization of HTIL from HK$95.6 
billion to HK$7.9 billion and the limited ‘free float’ of its shares, Hutchison 
Whampoa argued that it was no longer appropriate for it to be listed on the stock 
exchange. Moreover, in removing the pressures associated with being a public 
company, Hutchison Whampoa stated that it would be better placed to manage the 
business and make the appropriate investment decisions (Hutchison Whampoa, 
2010b). On 24 May 2010, Hutchison Whampoa announced that the Grand Court of 
the Cayman Islands, where HTIL was incorporated, had approved the privatization of 
the company, and that it was expected to become effective on the following day 
(Hutchison Whampoa, 2010c and 2010d). When the privatization was effected, HTIL 
was de-listed from the Hong Kong and New York stock exchanges, and subsequently 
changed its name to Hutchison Asia Telecommunications (HAT hereafter). With 
these changes, HAT would become a wholly-owned subsidiary of Hutchison 
Whampoa, while Hutchison Telecommunications Hong Kong Holdings would be a 
majority-owned subsidiary. 
The third vehicle through which Hutchison Whampoa has invested in the 
telecommunications industry is 3 Group. The 3 Group encompasses the company’s 
3G investments, primarily in Western Europe but also in Australia. Although 
Hutchison Whampoa only began to use the term ‘3 Group’ in its 2004 Annual Report, 
the origins of the company’s involvement with 3G can be found in 2000. Over the 
course of 2000, Hutchison Whampoa acquired 3G licences in four countries: Austria, 
Italy, Sweden and the UK (Hutchison Whampoa, 2001: 28ff). Hutchison Whampoa 
explicitly states that it is reinvesting part of the proceeds from the sale of Orange plc. 
in the acquisition of 3G licences. In Austria, the wholly-owned Hutchison 3G Austria 
paid €139 million for its licence, while in Italy and the UK the sums paid were 
considerably more at €3,254 million and £4,385 million respectively (Hutchison 
Whampoa, 2001: 29). In contrast, a nominal fee was paid for the Swedish 3G licence.  
The licences in Italy, Sweden and the UK were acquired through joint ventures. In 
November 2000, Andala SpA, a consortium headed by Tiscali, was awarded a 3G 
licence (Curwen and Whalley, 2006a: 629). Three months later, Hutchison Whampoa 
acquired 78.3 per cent of the company from Tiscali and other shareholders, changing 
the name of the company to H3G Italy. In the UK it sold 35 per cent of Hutchison 3G 
UK to NTT DoCoMo and KPN Mobile after it had successfully won the licence 
(Hutchison Whampoa, 2001: 29) – further details of this transaction are set out below. 
In the case of Sweden, Hutchison Whampoa entered into a joint venture – Hi3G 
Access – with Investor AB, the investment company of the Wallenberg family. 
Hutchison Whampoa owns 60 per cent of Hi3G Access, with Investor AB owning the 
remainder (Hutchison Whampoa, 2001: 29f).  
To offset the costs of rolling out a national infrastructure, Hi3G Access joined with 
two other 3G licence winners in Sweden, Orange Sverige and Vodafone, to form 
3GIS. This company would build a 3G infrastructure covering the 70 per cent of the 
Swedish population living outside the three main urban areas of Gothenburg, 
Malmö/Lund and Stockholm/Uppsala. Hi3G Access is unusual as it has acquired 3G 
6licences of its own in other Nordic markets. In September 2001, the company 
successfully bid DKr950 million for a 3G licence in Denmark (Hutchison Whampoa, 
2002: 27), and NKr62 million for a 3G licence in Norway (Hutchison Whampoa, 
2004: 27). Interestingly, the annual report states that the Norwegian business would 
be developed as an extension of those in Denmark and Sweden. In other words, 
Hutchison Whampoa viewed the three markets of Denmark, Norway and Sweden as 
being closely intertwined with one another. 
The final West European market in which 3 Group is present is Ireland. In June 2002, 
the wholly-owned Hutchison 3G Ireland paid $50 million for the largest of the 
available licences (Curwen and Whalley, 2006a: 629). 3 Group is also present in 
Australia where Hutchison Whampoa became the majority shareholder of Hutchison 
Telecommunications Australia. Hutchison Whampoa’s presence in Australia is 
outlined in the following section. 
4. Operational performance 
Geographical footprint 
The geographical footprint of Hutchison is presented in Table II. This table identifies 
those countries in which Hutchison has invested, either directly or indirectly through 
one of its various holding companies. The first observation that can be made is that 
the number of countries in which Hutchison has been present at one time or another 
has fluctuated. Broadly speaking, the number of countries in which Hutchison was 
present increased (1995 to 2002) before stabilizing (2003 to 2007) and then slowly 
falling away (2008 to 2011) to the present total of 13. Secondly, the main 
geographical focus of Hutchison’s various international investments has been in the 
Asia-Pacific region and Western Europe. Although the company has invested outside 
these two regions in countries such as Argentina, Ghana, Paraguay and the United 
States, these investments have been relatively short-lived. Hutchison entered these 
four countries only to leave a few years later. Nevertheless, the shortest time spent by 
Hutchison in a country was in Western Europe. In the cases of both Belgium and 
Switzerland, the company entered the market one year only to exit the next. As both 
investments were made by Orange plc, the exit from the market was due to the sale of 
that company to France Télécom.  
[Insert Table II about here] 
A third observation is that in the case of the UK, Hutchison exited the market only to 
re-enter it the following year. Hutchison exited the UK when it sold Orange only to 
re-enter the market in 2000 when it successfully participated in the 3G spectrum 
auction. Shortly after winning the fifth, and largest, 3G licence, Hutchison sold 35 per 
cent of the company to NTT DoCoMo (20 per cent) and KPN (15 per cent) for a total 
of £2.1 billion (NTT DoCoMo, 2000). However, the relationship between the three 
partners was problematic, with KPN refusing to contribute additional funds in early 
2003 to Hutchison 3G UK (Leahy and Nutall, 2003: 31). In November of the same 
year, KPN agreed to sell back its shares to Hutchison for £90 million while in May 
2004, NTT DoCoMo also agreed to sell its shares for £120 million. Hutchison 
completed the purchase of these shares in 2005 (Lau, 2005: 28).
9
7The equity held by Hutchison has also changed in other countries. Table II shows that 
in the case of India, Hutchison initially increased its ownership before expanding into 
other parts of the country. Hutchison launched its mobile operations in India in 1995, 
and was able to become the market leader in the Mumbai ‘circle’ (licence area) by the 
end of 1996 with more than 50,000 subscribers (Hutchison Whampoa, 1997). The 
1996 annual report states that Hutchison had an effective 29.4 per cent stake in its 
Indian mobile business. During 1998, Hutchison increased its stake in its Indian 
mobile business – Hutchison Max Telecommunications – to 49.5 per cent, and 
subscribed to the preference shares of another company holding a large stake in 
Hutchison Max (Hutchison Whampoa, 1999: 26).  
Purchases of other mobile operators expanded the geographical footprint of Hutchison 
Max in India. In 2000, it acquired a 49 per cent interest in three GSM operators in the 
New Delhi, Calcutta and Gujarat state circles (Hutchison Whampoa, 2001: 28), and 
further expanded in the following year when it paid $99 million for mobile licences in 
Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh and Chennai (Hutchison Whampoa, 2002: 28). In January 
2006, it acquired BPL Mobile Cellular which, when combined with the pending 
purchases of BPL Mobile Communications and Essar Spacetel, would expand the 
company’s footprint in India to 23 circles (Hutchison Whampoa, 2006: 47). In other 
words, Hutchison would have a substantial presence across India.
Unlike the case of India where Hutchison increased both its ownership and 
geographical footprint over time, the latter seems to be the driving force in Australia. 
Hutchison has been present in Australia since 1989 when it started offering paging 
services (Hutchison Telecommunications Australia, 2010). At some point after 1989 
but before 1997, the company also began to offer GSM-based mobile services and had 
143,000 subscribers by the end of 1997 (Hutchison Whampoa, 1998).
10 During 1997, 
Hutchison also increased its stake in its Australian joint venture from 56 per cent to 
70 per cent (Hutchison Whampoa, 1998). In 1998, the company was awarded CDMA 
licences covering Sydney and Melbourne, and signed a national roaming agreement 
with Telstra in the following year (Hutchison Telecommunications Australia, 2010). 
1999 also saw the initial public offering (IPO) of Hutchison Telecommunications 
Australia, raising A$235 million to fund the construction of the company’s CDMA 
network (Hutchison Whampoa, 2000). As a result of the IPO, Hutchison’s stake in its 
Australian business fell to 54 per cent. 
In 2001, Hutchison Telecommunications Australia won 3G licences covering the 
country’s five major cities and sold its GSM resale business to Singapore Telecom for 
A$41 million (Hutchison Whampoa, 2002). Network coverage was expanded by 
entering into an infrastructure sharing agreement with Telstra in 2004, with Hutchison 
receiving a one-off payment of A$450 million and a 50 per cent interest in the joint 
venture. A key component of the joint venture agreement was the subsequent 
expansion of network coverage to 96 per cent of the population. The CDMA network 
was closed in 2006 (Hutchison Telecommunications Australia, 2010), with services 
being delivered using 2G and, increasingly, 3G technologies.
Another joint venture was entered into in 2009, this time with Vodafone when the two 
companies merged their Australian mobile businesses to create Vodafone Hutchison 
Australia. Reflecting the difference in value between the two businesses, Vodafone 
paid Hutchison Telecommunications Australia A$587 million (Vodafone, 2009). This 
8enabled the joint venture to be owned equally by the two companies. Although the 
creation of Vodafone Hutchison Australia was accompanied by the licensing of the 
‘3’ brand, several commentators took the view that the brand would only be used in 
the short term, unlike that of Vodafone (Sainsbury, 2009; Vodafone, 2009). At the 
heart of the merger was the desire to improve the performance of both mobile 
businesses through expanding network coverage, gaining scale economies and 
combining their different strengths (Middleton, 2009; Sainsbury, 2009).
Geographical expansion within a country has also played a role in Thailand and the 
United States, albeit arguably to a lesser extent than in Australia or India. Hutchison 
has been present in Thailand since 2002. Its presence in the country, in terms of the 
structure and nature of the investments, is significantly influenced by the unique 
approach to the telecommunications sector that has been adopted in Thailand. 
Hutchison, through HTIL, held stakes in two companies in Thailand: Hutchison CAT 
Wireless Multimedia Ltd and BFKT (Thailand) Ltd (Hutchison Telecommunications 
International Limited, 2006). The former provided mobile telecommunication services 
using cdma2000 1xRTT while the latter was a network leasing company. Limits on 
the foreign ownership of companies in Thailand resulted in a complex organizational 
structure being adopted. As outlined in the 2005 Annual Report of HTIL, two 
companies owned Hutchison CAT: Hutchison Wireless (73.9 per cent) and CAT 
Telecom (26 per cent). In turn, 49 per cent of Hutchison Wireless was owned by 
HTIL and 41 per cent by GMRP (Thailand) Ltd. Three individual shareholders owned 
the remaining 10 per cent. The voting strength of the shares also differed; HTIL’s 
shares carried one vote per share while GMRP’s shares were considerably weaker at 
one vote per 20 shares. GMRP held the shares in Hutchison Wireless on behalf of 
HTIL, and its articles of association were such that HTIL could direct it to buy more 
equity in Hutchison Wireless or sell the shares that it held to another company that it 
designated.
11 Through this arrangement of cascading stakes, HTIL controlled a 36.2 
per cent economic interest in Hutchison CAT. Although some of the equity stakes 
have changed in subsequent years, the structure as described remains essentially the 
same.  
Within Thailand, the footprint of Hutchison CAT covered 25 out of the country’s 76 
provinces (Hutchison Telecommunications International Ltd, 2008). Although these 
provinces accounted for the majority of Thailand’s economic output, a significant 
proportion of the population was obviously unable to access Hutchison CAT services. 
After technology trials in 2006, Hutchison CAT and CAT Telecom entered into a 
nationwide roaming agreement in 2007 that expanded the former’s scope to 
encompass all of Thailand (Hutchison Telecommunications International Ltd, 2008). 
While this widening of geographical coverage may have contributed to an increase in 
the number of Hutchison CAT subscribers and reduced churn between 2006 and 
2008, revenues, in total and on a per user basis, fell over the same period (Hutchison 
Telecommunications International Ltd, 2009). Given this decline in revenues, it is not 
surprising that the 2009 Annual Report stated that the company was in discussions to 
exit the market (Hutchison Whampoa, 2010a: 50). In April 2010, CAT Telecom was 
given government approval to purchase Hutchison CAT for THB7.5 billion 
(Telegeography, 2010a). However, the appointment of a new board at CAT Telecom 
resulted in the acquisition initially being questioned before the government ordered 
CAT Telecom to pay no more than THB4 billion (Telegeography, 2010b, 2010c and 
2010d). With Hutchison refusing to accept such a sum, the sale to CAT Telecom 
9collapsed allowing True to acquire Hutchison’s operations in Thailand for THB4.35 
billion (Telegeography, 2010e). The sale was completed in early 2011 (Hutchison 
Whampoa, 2011; Telegeography, 2011a).  
In 1997, Hutchison acquired minority stakes in two US-based mobile operators: 
Western Wireless Inc. and Western PCS Corp. (Hutchison Whampoa, 1998). In the 
following year, Western PCS Corp was re-branded as VoiceStream Wireless PCS, 
and expanded its geographical footprint by merging with two other mobile operators – 
Aerial Communications and Omnipoint – during 1999 and 2000 (Hutchison 
Whampoa, 2000). By the time these mergers had been completed, Hutchison’s stake 
in VoiceStream had risen to 23 per cent (Hutchison Whampoa, 2000).
12 In July 2000, 
VoiceStream agreed to merge with Deutsche Telekom in a deal worth $50.7 billion 
plus the assumption of $4.2 billion of debt (Curwen and Whalley, 2004: 16). As a 
result of this deal, Hutchison received $885 million in cash plus shares in Deutsche 
Telekom amounting to 4.9 per cent of the company (Hutchison Whampoa, 2002: 29). 
Hutchison realized a profit of HK$30,000 million on the sale of VoiceStream to 
Deutsche Telekom, and subsequently sold its stake in Deutsche Telekom over a 
period of several years (The Economist, 2001; Hutchison Whampoa, 2002; 
Telegeography, 2003).
As noted above, the investments made by Hutchison in the United States were one of 
a handful made outside its main geographical focus of the Asia-Pacific region and 
Western Europe. Hutchison has made just a single investment in Africa, when in 1998 
it acquired 80 per cent of Kasapa Telecom Ltd in Ghana (Hutchison 
Telecommunications International Limited, 2007). In December 2004, the company 
was awarded a 15-year replacement licence enabling CDMA-based services to be 
delivered. Hutchison acquired the remaining 20 per cent of the company in January 
2005. In January 2008, Hutchison agreed to sell Kasapa to EGH International Limited 
for HK$583.5 million (Hutchison Telecommunications International Limited, 2008), 
completing the sale in July 2008 (Hutchison Telecommunications International 
Limited, 2009). 
As well as investing in Africa, Hutchison has also invested in two Latin American 
markets. In the case of Paraguay, the annual reports of both Hutchison Whampoa and 
HTIL shed little light on the nature and scale of the business in this particular market. 
The first mention of Hutchison being present in Paraguay occurs in the 2000 Annual 
Report, but is not until the following year that sufficient details are provided to make 
it possible to state that the business was a 2G mobile operator 60 per cent owned by 
Hutchison (Hutchison Whampoa, 2002: 27). The 2G network covered the major cities 
of Paraguay. The business was sold for an undisclosed amount to América Móvil in 
July 2005 (Hutchison Telecom, 2005). 
The second Latin American market in which Hutchison invested was Argentina. In 
Argentina, Hutchison provided mobile services through wireless local loop 
technologies (Hutchison Telecommunications International Ltd, 2006), and thus did 
not provide true mobile services as it did in other markets. Hutchison Argentina was a 
subsidiary of Hutchison Whampoa, so with the creation of HTIL an option to acquire 
the company was entered into in September 2004 (Hutchison Telecommunications 
International Ltd, 2006). This option ensured that Hutchison Argentina would 
continue to operate for three years and could not be sold to another company without 
10both parties agreeing, enabling HTIL to evaluate the viability of its technology and 
thus determine whether it should purchase the company. This option does not appear 
to have been exercised, with Hutchison Argentina being removed from the footprint 
map included in the annual report of Hutchison Whampoa in 2005.  
Mobile subscribers 
Although Hutchison has invested in fixed-wire markets, the main investment focus 
has been towards mobile markets. As can be seen from Figure II, the number of 
mobile subscribers has risen almost sevenfold since 2003. As of December 2010, the 
various mobile operations of Hutchison had collectively 33.4 million proportionate 
(adjusted for the size of the equity stake) subscribers. Although this makes Hutchison 
in its entirety a large operator, two caveats need to be taken into account. Firstly, in 
the context of the global mobile telecommunications industry, Hutchison is not a large 
operator. Curwen and Whalley (2006b) propose a methodology for assessing 
internationalization in the mobile telecommunications industry.
13 Updating Curwen 
and Whalley (2006b) to the end of 2010 reveals that Hutchison is the 23
rd-largest
mobile operator globally when measured by the number of proportionate subscribers. 
Moreover, Hutchison’s subscriber base is such that it is located towards the lower end 
of the list of mobile operators with international footprints on any scale.
[Insert Figure II about here] 
Secondly, the 33.4 million proportionate subscribers controlled by Hutchison are 
located in just two regions: Western Europe and Asia-Pacific. This in itself is 
arguably not a problem as the focus on the two regions could engender scale 
economies or additional revenue from roaming customers. Nevertheless, a closer 
examination of the subscriber base of Hutchison reveals that within these two regions 
subscribers are concentrated in a handful of countries. Within Western Europe, Italy 
and the UK have since 2004 been consistently the two largest two markets in terms of 
subscribers. In contrast, in the Asia-Pacific region, the largest provider of subscribers 
has changed over time, from India (2003 to 2006 inclusive) to China (2007) and, more 
recently, Indonesia (2008 to 2010 inclusive). The concentration of the subscriber base 
in a handful of countries is clearly evident if the ratio between the largest three 
markets and the overall subscriber base is calculated. The largest three countries have 
not accounted for less than 65 per cent of the overall subscriber base of Hutchison 
since 2003. The rapid growth of the company in India, Italy and UK not only 
underpinned the growth in the overall subscriber base of Hutchison, but also resulted 
in these three countries accounting for 82 per cent of the company’s proportionate 
subscribers in 2005. Since 2005, the subscriber base has become less concentrated, 
with the largest three markets (Indonesia, Italy and the UK) accounting for 65 per cent 
of all proportionate subscribers at the end of 2010.
Financial performance 
Determining the financial performance of Hutchison Whampoa in the 
telecommunications industry is not straightforward. Apart from the seemingly 
constant restructuring of its various telecommunication operations noted above, 
determining the financial success of Hutchison is complicated by two other factors: 
firstly, the company has frequently restated its revenues and profits and, secondly, 
11EBIT/LBIT (earnings/loss before interest and taxation) is used to calculate 3 Group 
profits. The use of EBIT/LBIT is unusual to say the least, as it leaves out depreciation 
and amortization.   
Table III presents the earnings of Hutchison’s telecommunications division between 
1995 and 2003. Earnings as stated in the relevant annual report are presented rather 
than subsequent restatements. The first observation we can make is that the profits 
from the telecommunications division are rather modest, in both absolute terms and 
when compared to the extraordinary items. From the table it would appear that the 
telecommunications division produced its highest profit in 1996, though this is 
slightly misleading as the total for that year, HK$3,642 million, included an 
unspecified profit from the initial public offering of its UK-based mobile operator, 
Orange plc. Profits after extraordinary items fall after 1997, and slowly climb back to 
a broadly similar level over the next six years. Even so, the level of profits reported by 
the telecommunications division of Hutchison remains relatively modest when 
compared to the extraordinary items reported. The substantial figure for 1999 is 
composed of the sale of equity in Orange and the initial public offering of Partner 
Communications in Israel. Unravelling the aftermath of the Mannesmann/Vodafone 
merger contributed to the large level of extraordinary items for 2000, as did the sale of 
equity in two other Hutchison telecommunication businesses. Together, the 
extraordinary items for these two years amount to HK$138.4 billion, or more than £11 
billion at the current exchange rate.
[Insert Table III about here] 
The picture presented in Table IV is more complicated, reflecting changes to 
Hutchison’s organizational structure and the tendency of the company to report 
income including extraordinary items. Nevertheless, it appears that HTIL reported 
profits of almost HK$67 billion although this is primarily due to the sale of the 
company’s operations in India to Vodafone for HK$69.3 billion (Hutchison 
Whampoa, 2008). In other words, without this sale HTIL would be loss-making in 
2007. Extraordinary items appear to be determining the profitability of HTIL – the 
loss incurred on the sale of the Paraguayan operations is only partially offset by the 
gain from the sale of equity in Hutchison Global Crossing Holdings, resulting in a 
loss overall for 2005. Extraordinary items contribute to the profits reported in 2008 
and 2009, although the extent to which this is the case is unclear given the manner in 
which they are reported. Although 2010 saw two extraordinary items, amounting to 
almost HK$1 billion, being reported against HAT, the company was still loss-making 
overall.
[Insert Table IV about here] 
Table IV suggests that 3 Group has been profitable twice since 2004; that is, in 2005 
and 2010. This is arguably misleading as the profits for 2005 were subsequently 
restated in the following year using a different methodology, resulting in the company 
reported a loss (Hutchison Whampoa, 2006). Between 2004 and 2009 (inclusive), the 
losses incurred by 3 Group amounted to HK$97.7 billion. This is a considerable sum, 
but it amounts to less than half of the profits Hutchison made from selling assets in 
just three years (1999, 2000 and 2007). In these three years, extraordinary items 
totalled HK$207.8 billion. In other words, the losses incurred by 3 Group were less 
12than half of the income gained from the sale of Orange and Hutchison’s Indian 
operations. Interestingly, Hunt (2010) states that Hutchison’s 3G operations had 
accumulated losses of HK$158 billion since 2003. While it is not clear how this has 
been calculated, it would still be less than the sum raised by the extraordinary items in 
1999, 2000 and 2007.
After taking into account the restatement for 2005, there is only a single year in which 
3 Group has been profitable. While a series of extraordinary items did contribute to 
the group’s profitability in 2010, the various 3G mobile businesses within the group 
also performed strongly. Every operation except that in Ireland reported positive 
EBIT in the second half of 2010 (Hutchison Whampoa, 2011a). While Table III charts 
the gradual financial improvement of 3 Group’s various mobile businesses, it does not 
shed any light on the individual performance of these operations. Until recently, the 
review of Hutchison’s telecommunications operations in the annual report did not 
provide detailed figures regarding the profit or loss of its various businesses, and 
instead relied on terms such as ‘151% better than last year’ in the case of Italy or, in 
the case of Sweden and Denmark, ‘first full-year positive EBITDA’ to describe 
performance (Hutchison Whampoa, 2007: 55).  
[Insert Table V about here] 
By combining qualitative descriptions of the financial performance of the various 
businesses within 3 Group with the quantitative statements that are available, Table V 
highlights two issues. Although at the start of the period the detail provided by 
Hutchison, with the exception of Australia, is somewhat imprecise, the general trend 
in the comments indicates a gradual improvement in the operational performance of 
the various mobile businesses. By the end of 2010, only Ireland continues to be loss-
making. There is, however, a degree of volatility in the financial performance of the 
various businesses. For example, 3 Italia achieves break-even before becoming loss-
making in 2008 and 2009, while in Australia the positive earnings in 2007 and 2010 
are surrounded by losses in other years.
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The more detailed information that is available for 2009 and 2010 highlights a second 
issue, namely the relatively low profitability of the various businesses. The most 
profitable country would appear to be the UK, followed by Italy. This is perhaps 
unsurprising when the large populations, and thus subscriber bases, of Hutchison in 
these two countries, are taken into account. In contrast, the profits made in four 
countries combined – Australia, Austria, Denmark and Sweden – are less than those 
made in Italy. In other words, the overall profitability of 3 Group is largely dependent 
on just two markets, Italy and the United Kingdom. 
As noted above, extraordinary items play a significant role in determining the 
profitability of HTIL. Although Table IV clearly demonstrates that HTIL has been 
profitable more times than it has made a loss, even when the extraordinary item in 
2007 is taken into account, it does not shed light on the performance of individual 
businesses which is presented in Table VI. It is clear from Table VI that the mobile 
operations in some countries – Indonesia and Vietnam – have never been profitable, 
while others – Sri Lanka and Thailand – have flipped between profitability and loss-
making. In contrast, the mobile operations in India and Israel were profitable 
throughout the period they were owned by HTIL. It is not clear why HTIL would 
13choose to sell both of its consistently profitable mobile businesses, though the sales 
would conceivably generate revenue that could sustain losses elsewhere as these 
businesses edged towards profitability as well as fund new investments. 
[Insert Table VI about here] 
The fixed-wire and mobile operations in Hong Kong and Macau are consistently 
profitable throughout the period in question. As shown in Figure III, the profitability
of the mobile businesses in Hong Kong and Macau exceeded that of the fixed-wire 
operations between 2005 and 2008 (inclusive), with the margin widening over time. 
After 2008, profits are lower but the higher profitability of mobile compared to fixed-
wire businesses continues into 2009 and 2010. Figure III clearly shows that, after the 
creation and flotation of the Hong Kong and Macau fixed-wire and mobile businesses, 
their profitability falls substantially. The relevant annual reports do not shed any light 
on this decline in profitability, with the 2009 annual report noting that the figure was 
actually an increase over 2008 (Hutchison Whampoa, 2010a: 48). However, the 
substantial fall can be attributed to a change in how the results are reported. Prior to 
2009, EBITDA was used as an indicator of financial performance, while subsequent 
to 2009 a different measure – ‘operating profit’ – is used (Hutchison 
Telecommunications Hong Kong Holdings, 2011a).
15 Whatever the relative merits of 
the two measures and the degree of obfuscation that results from the switch between 
them, what can be stated with a degree of certainty is that the mobile businesses in the 
two markets are more profitable than the fixed-wire ones between 2004 and 2010 
(inclusive).
[Insert Figure III about here] 
5. Discussion 
Sections 3 and 4 have charted Hutchison Whampoa’s involvement in the 
telecommunications industry. It is clear from both of these sections that the 
company’s involvement is not straight-forward. The organizational structure that has 
been adopted is complex, involving a series of listed holding companies that are 
connected to the operating companies through another tier of intermediate companies. 
Hutchison Whampoa has actively engaged in the sale and purchase of companies. 
Two of these sales have been highly successful – the sale of Orange plc. to France 
Télécom and of the Indian operations to Vodafone. But can Hutchison Whampoa 
repeat this feat for a third time? 
Hutchison Whampoa has used a significant proportion of the proceeds from the sales 
of Orange and its Indian operations to fund the development of 3 Group. As a result 
of the acquisition of a series of 3G licences and the launch of mobile services in seven 
countries, 3 Group now accounts for two-thirds of all mobile subscribers controlled 
by Hutchison Whampoa. While 3 Group has fared better in some countries than 
others, it remains the smallest operator when measured by mobile subscribers in all 
the markets where it is present. The description of HTIL as ‘lacking scale’ when it 
was taken private by Hutchison Whampoa arguably applies to 3 Group. As a 
consequence, it is unlikely that Hutchison Whampoa will be able to float all or part of 
3 Group, either in its entirety or in individual countries, for sums that would begin to 
repay the investment.  
14Since 2006, Hutchison Whampoa has published more detailed financial data 
regarding the performance of 3 Group. This data are presented below in Table VII and 
enable an initial assessment of the performance of 3 Group to be made. With respect 
to revenue, Table VII highlights the decline that has been experienced in Italy, with 
revenues falling by 18 per cent between 2006 and 2010. Revenues have also declined 
in the UK, albeit by only 1.6 per cent. In contrast, revenues have increased in 
Australia, Austria, and Denmark and Sweden (which are reported together), with the 
rise being particularly significant in the case of the former two countries.  
[Insert Table Vii about here] 
A more uniform picture is presented by the other two performance measures that 
appear in Table VII. In all cases, average revenue per user (ARPU) has declined. In 
those countries where revenues have increased – Austria, Australia and Denmark and 
Sweden (combined) – this would suggest that subscriber numbers in these countries 
have also increased, sometimes substantially so. Although the declines indicate a 
deterioration in 3 Group’s financial performance, the rate at which ARPU has fallen 
has slowed in four cases – Australia, Austria, Denmark and Sweden (combined) and 
the UK – and has even been reversed, albeit only marginally, in Italy in recent years. 
A contributory factor to arresting this decline has been the shifting balance of ARPU 
composition. The proportion of ARPU accounted for by non-voice products has 
increased in all cases, with a majority of ARPU in Austria and Ireland now coming 
from non-voice sources.  
It is informative to compare 3 Group to the other operators against which it competes. 
Merrill Lynch publishes quarterly reports detailing the performance of operators in 35 
different countries. However, not all of the countries where 3 Group operates are 
included in the Merrill Lynch reports, nor does it cover all of the operators present in 
each of the markets and the data do not appear to correspond with data published by 
Hutchison Whampoa in its annual reports. As such, any analysis needs to be treated 
with a degree of caution. Nevertheless, Merrill Lynch (2010) does provide sufficient 
data in two countries to see how well 3 Group has performed compared to its 
competitors. According to Merrill Lynch (2010), 3 Italia had a higher APRU than 
TIM, Vodafone and Wind at the end of 2006. Although the APRU of all operators 
subsequently fell, it fell fastest for 3 Italia so that by the end of 2009 the situation had 
completely reversed itself – 3 Italia now had the lowest ARPU. The declining 
financial position has encouraged, once again, rumours that 3 Italia will be sold to one 
of its competitors (Telegeography, 2011b). The situation is somewhat different in the 
UK. In parallel with the other operators in the UK market, 3 UK has witnessed an 
ARPU decline between the end-2006 and end-2009, but it has remained the highest 
among the five mobile network operators in the market.
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The incomplete nature of the data included in Merrill Lynch (2010) means that it is 
difficult to compare 3 Group companies to their competitors on other performance 
measures. Nevertheless, sufficient data are provided to compare year-on-year service 
revenue growth in three countries, Austria, Italy and the UK. In Figure IV, the year-
on-year service revenue growth of ‘3’ is compared against the country average, with a 
positive figure indicating that ‘3’ service revenues grew faster than the country 
average and a negative figure that they grew more slowly. 
15[Insert Figure IV about here] 
In two countries, Italy and the UK, service revenues initially grew at a much faster 
rate than the country average. However, this is not that surprising when the law of 
large numbers is taken into account – in both countries ‘3’ was growing from a 
relatively small subscriber base, unlike its competitors. Over three years the growth 
rate declines, so that by 2007 it is more or less aligned in both countries with the 
market average. In Austria, ‘3’ has grown faster than the country average on three 
occasions, but on only one occasion has the growth rate been substantially higher.  
Merrill Lynch (2010) also provides data on capital expenditure in Australia and the 
UK. For Australia, data are provided for three operators – Telstra, Optus and 
Hutchison – between 2004 and 2009. With the exception of 2004, the capital 
expenditure of Hutchison is less than that of the other two companies with the 
difference fluctuating over the period. In the UK, data are provided for all five mobile 
network operators between 2004 and 2010.
17 Capital expenditure has fallen for three 
operators (Vodafone, Orange and ‘3’), and increased for one (T-Mobile). In the case 
of the former O2, capital expenditure fell, albeit not significantly, before ending the 
period higher than at the start. Hutchison spent more on capital expenditure than three 
of its competitors in 2004 compared to one in 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2009. The 
relatively low level of capital expenditure may have been influenced by the joint 
venture created between 3 UK and T-Mobile in 2007 (Middleton, 2007).
18 Through 
sharing masts and the 3G access network, an estimated £2 billion would be saved over 
10 years. 
6. Conclusions 
This paper has outlined the presence of Hutchison Whampoa in the 
telecommunications industry. Through doing so, the scope and complexity of 
Hutchison Whampoa’s involvement has been demonstrated. As markets have been 
entered and exited, businesses around the world have been bought and sold. 
Hutchison Whampoa has also made extensive use of holdings companies, some of 
which have been listed on various stock exchanges, as well as intermediate companies 
that link these holding companies to the various operating companies.
The scale and scope of Hutchison Whampoa’s involvement in the telecommunications 
industry provides the context for the question that this paper has sought to address, 
namely, whether it will be able to repeat its previous successes of Orange and its 
Indian mobile businesses. Both of these were sold for a considerable amount, enabling 
Hutchison Whampoa to fund the development of 3 Group. This development, 
however, has not been straightforward with a consequence that it has consumed a 
significant proportion of the sum raised from the sale of Orange and the Indian mobile 
business.
But has this investment resulted in a successful business? The picture is mixed. In 
those markets where it is present, 3 Group is the smallest operator and APRU has 
fallen. Moreover, where data are available, year-on-year revenue growth is no better 
than its competitors. Nevertheless, 3 Group is profitable in all bar one of its markets 
and it has been able to switch the balance of revenue towards non-voice sources. Even 
16so, the relatively small size of 3 Group makes its purchase by another operator 
unlikely. Quite simply, the criticism levelled by Hutchison Whampoa against HTIL as 
it was being ‘privatized’, namely, that it lacked scale, also applies to 3 Group. A more 
likely development would be the piecemeal sale of 3 Group, though the prices that the 
various businesses would fetch are limited by the lack of potential bidders in each 
case. For example, in the UK there are three potential bidders while in Italy there are 
just two other operators who could use the opportunity to acquire a rival and improve 
their scale economies. As the various parts of 3 Group are unlikely to fetch large sums 
and their operational performance is mixed, it is not going to be ‘third time lucky’ for 
Hutchison Whampoa. 
Notes
1.  See, for example, Attiyeh (1969), Hopper and Macintosh (1993), Kerr and Darroch (2005), 
Sampson (1973) and Sobel (1982). 
2.  The ‘diversification discount’ refers to the notion that as a company diversifies away from its 
original business, value is destroyed. Thus, highly diversified companies are valued at a 
discount to their more narrowly focused counterparts. For further details see, for example, 
Anjos (2010) or Schmid and Walter (2009). 
3.  Although Philip Morris began the divestment of Kraft in 2001 with the sale of a minority 
stake in Kraft Foods, it was not completed until 2007 when the remaining shares (88.1 per 
cent) were distributed to its own shareholders.  
4.  See, for example, Curwen and Whalley (2006a). 
5.  The eight listed subsidiaries and associated companies identified by Hutchison Whampoa on 
its website are: Hutchison Telecommunications Hong Kong Holdings, Hutchison 
Telecommunications Australia, Cheung Kong Infrastructure Holdings Ltd, Hutchison China 
MediTech, Husky Energy, Hutchison Harbour Ring Ltd, Hutchison Port Holdings and TOM 
Group Ltd.    
6.  The Cheung Kong Group consists of Cheung Kong Holdings, Hutchison Whampoa, Power 
Assets Holdings Ltd, Cheung Kong Infrastructure Holdings Ltd, CK Life Sciences 
International (Holdings) Inc., Hutchison Telecommunications Hong Kong Holdings Ltd, 
Hutchison Harbour Ring Ltd and TOM Group Ltd. For further details of the scale and scope 
of Cheung Kong Holdings see www.ckh.com.hk 
7.  See www.uncatd.org/wir for further details of the World Investment Report published 
annually by United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). 
8.  On completion of the merger, Hutchison Whampoa owned 73 per cent of the enlarged 
company. This was subsequently reduced to 53 per cent through a placement of shares 
resulting in a profit of almost HK$1300 million (Hutchison Whampoa, 2004: 23). 
9.  Interestingly, the various annual reports of Hutchison provide contradictory dates for the 
completion of the re-purchase of equity in Hutchison 3G UK from NTT DoCoMo and KPN. 
10.  The 1995 and 1996 annual reports do not describe in detail the businesses operated by 
Hutchison in Australia, nor do they elaborate on the nature of the investment that the company 
has made. 
11.  A similar set of arrangements surround BFKT (Thailand) Ltd. HTIL owns 49 per cent of 
PKNS, with the remaining 51 per cent being owned by DPBB (Thailand) Ltd. PKNS, in turn, 
owns BFKT. 
1712. However, the following year’s annual report stated that Hutchison held an effective interest of 
18.4 per cent in VoiceStream (Hutchison Whampoa, 2001: 31).   
13.  The four dimensions for measuring internationalization as suggested in Curwen & Whalley 
(2006) are the number of countries, the number of proportionate subscribers, the number of 
proportionate subscribers by region and psychic dispersion. 
14.  It is worth treating the reported profits and losses for Australia with a degree of caution. In 
2004, Hutchison stated its net loss attributable to shareholders to be A$522 million (Hutchison 
Whampoa, 2004). The following year, the loss of A$547 million was reported as being a 21 
per cent improvement on the previous year’s results (Hutchison Whampoa, 2005). This is only 
possible when the re-stated profits for 2004, published in the 2005 Annual Report, are used. 
15.  The company also differentiates between profit that is attributable to the shareholders of 
HTHKH and that attributable to non-controlling interests (Hutchison Telecommunications 
Hong Kong Holdings, 2010: 6). The Annual Report does not provide a clear statement of the 
difference between these two measures. 
16.  Merrill Lynch (2010) also provides estimates of the situation at the end of 2010. If these are 
taken into consideration, average revenue per user (ARPU) in both Italy and the UK continues 
to fall in 2010. However, the positions are quite different between the two markets – in Italy, 3 
Italia’s ARPU is the lowest in the market while in the UK the ARPU of 3 UK is the highest.  
17.  The capital expenditure figures for 2010 in the UK are estimated in Merrill Lynch (2010). 
18.  Mobile Broadband Network was created as an equally-owned joint venture between 3 UK and 
T-Mobile (Middleton, 2007).  
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York and Geneva.Figure 1  Structure of Hutchison Whampoa, August 2011. 
Source: Compiled by the authors from the annual reports and 20-F filings of Hutchison Whampoa, 
Hutchison Telecommunications (Australia) Ltd, Hutchison Telecommunications International Ltd and 
Hutchison Telecommunications Hong Kong Holdings Ltd. 
22Table I  Timeline of events, 1989 to 2011  
Year Event 
1989   Australia – launched paging services through a joint venture 
1991   UK – acquired Microtel 
1994   UK – renames operations as Orange Personal Communications Services Ltd 
1995   India – 2G joint ventures commences operations 
 Hong Kong – 2G services commerce 
1996   UK – creates Orange plc. as a holding company, and floats 30 per cent on London 
Stock Exchange and NASDAQ  
1997   Australia – gained a 3G licence 
 Hong Kong – sale of shares in Asia Satellite Telecommunications Holdings to CITIC 
 Sri Lanka – entered the market through acquiring 100 per cent of Hutchison Lanka 
1998   Australia – commences mobile operations 
 Belgium – Orange acquires 50 per cent stake in KPN Orange Belgium 
 Ghana – acquired 80 per cent Kasapa 
 Hong Kong – sale of remaining stake in Asia Satellite Telecommunications Holdings 
 India – raises stake in Hutchison Max Telecommunications from 24.9 per cent to 49.5 
per cent 
 Israel – invests in Partner Communications 
 Switzerland – Orange acquires 50 per cent stake in Orange Communications SA 
1999   Australia – Hutchison Telecommunications (Australia) ltd listed on stock exchange, 
reducing stake held to 54 per cent 
 Hong Kong – sale of 19 per cent stake in Hutchison Telephone to NTT DoCoMo 
 Hong Kong – sale of 50 per cent stake in the group’s fixed, Internet and data services 
businesses to Global Crossing. Hutchison Global Crossing created. 
 Israel – Partner Communications floated on London Stock Exchange and NASDAQ; 
services commence in Israel 
 UK – sale of Orange plc. to France Télécom 
 UK – gains 5 per cent stake in Vodafone in aftermath of Vodafone, Orange, 
Mannesmann and France Télécom takeover battle 
 USA – VoiceStream expands its geographical footprint by merging with two other 
operators  
2000   Austria – awarded 3G licence 
 India – purchases 49 per cent of GSM operations in New Delhi, Calcutta and Gujarat 
state
 Italy – awarded 3G licence 
 Sweden – awarded 3G licence 
 UK – awarded 3G licence 
 USA – VoiceStream shareholders agree to merger with Deutsche Telekom 
2001   Argentina – provision of mobile services 
 Australia – forms strategic alliance with TCNZ 
 Denmark – awarded a 3G licence 
 India – forms joint venture with Essar Group to acquire additional mobile licences 
 Macau – 2G operations commence 
 Paraguay – provision of mobile services 
 USA – Deutsche Telekom/VoiceStream merger completed 
2002   Ireland – awarded 3G licence 
 USA – bankruptcy court agrees that it can invest in Global Crossing 
2003   Hong Kong – acquires 37 per cent of Vanda, a listed IT company 
 Norway – awarded 3G licence 
 UK – repurchases equity held by NTT DoCoMo and KPN Mobile 
2004   Hong Kong – Vanda acquires Hutchison Global Communications and PowerCom 
Network Hong Kong, and is renamed Hutchison Global Communication. A 26 per cent 
stake is subsequently sold. 
 Hong Kong – 3G services commence 
 Hong Kong – lists Hutchison Telecommunications International Ltd on Hong Kong 
2324
 Indonesia – announces intention to acquire 60 per cent of PT Cyber Access 
Communications 
2005   Paraguay – sale of Hutchison Telecom 
 Hong Kong – Hutchison Telecommunications International Ltd acquires outstanding 
shares in Hutchison Global Crossing Holdings 
 Hong Kong – sale of 19.3 per cent stake in Hutchison Telecommunications 
International by Hutchison Whampoa to Orascom 
2006   Indian – expands geographical footprint through acquiring BPL Mobile Cellular and 
Essar Spacetel 
 Macau – awarded a 3G licence 
2007   India – sale of Indian operations held by CGP Investment (Holdings) Ltd 
 Macau – 3G operations commence 
2008   Ghana – sale of Kasapa 
2009   Australia – announces merger of Australian operations with Vodafone 
 Hong Kong – divests Hutchison Telecommunications Hong Kong to shareholders 
 Hong Kong – announces repurchase of Hutchison Telecommunications International 
Ltd
 Israel – sale of remaining equity in Partner Communications 
2010   Hong Kong – completes repurchase of Hutchison Telecommunications International 
and delists the company from the stock exchange 
2011   Thailand – sale of Hutchison Wireless Multimedia Holdings to True Corp 
Source: Compiled by the authors from the annual reports and 20-F filings of Hutchison Whampoa,
Hutchison Telecommunications (Australia) Ltd, Hutchison Telecommunications International Ltd and
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 per cent - Shareholding increased  
 per cent - Shareholding decreased
Notes:
1.   Part of 3 Group 
2.   Held via Orange plc 
3.   Wholly-owned subsidiaries of 60 per cent Hi3G Access 
4.   Held via Hutchison Telecommunications International Limited (HTIL) 
5.   Part of Hutchison Telecommunications Hong Kong Holdings Limited 
6.   Limited information is provided in the earlier Annual Reports regarding when it entered the Australian market However, 
Hutchison Telecommunications (Australia) Ltd (2009) does provide a timeline of the company’s presence in Australia, 
showing that it first entered in 1989 
7.   1996 Annual Report mentions rapid growth compared to 1995, thus implying that mobile operations were present in 
Hong Kong in 1995 
8.   The 1996 Annual Report implies that the Indian joint ventures commenced operations in 1995, though it does not say 
when the joint ventures were established 
9.   Hutchison Whampoa’s first entry into the UK telecommunications occurred in 1991, followed by the creation of Orange 
PCS in 1994 
10. Shares sold as part of IPO 
11. Sale of Orange plc. to France Telecom 
12. Shortly after winning a UK 3G licence, Hutchison Whampoa reduced its stake in its UK operations to 65 per cent 
through selling shares to NTT DoCoMo (20 per cent) and KPN Mobile (15 per cent) 
13. According to the 2004 Annual Report, this investment was not part of either HTIL or 3 Group 
14. Announces strategic alliance with TCNZ 
15. Various annual reports provide contradictory dates regarding when the stakes held by NTT DoCoMo and KPN Mobile 
were repurchased 
16. The company does not own a network but instead is allocated profits pro rata  
17. As no explicit mention of the sale of the Argentina business is made in the annual reports, the 2005 exit date is derived 
from the footprint maps provided 
18. HTIL sold CGP Investment (Holdings) Limited, the vehicle owning its operations in India  
19. Expands coverage but is not national in scope  
20. Merger with Vodafone Australia with the result that Hutchison Telecommunications Australia Limited owns 50 per cent 
of Vodafone Hutchison Australia. 
21. Although the holding company was spun-off, Hutchison Whampoa retained a majority stake in Hutchison 
Telecommunications Hong Kong (Holdings) 
22. Although a licence has been awarded, operations have yet to start in Norway 
23. Sold during January 2011 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table V  The fluctuating financial performance of 3 Group, 2006-2010 
Country 
(currency) 
2004 2005 2006 2007  2008  2009  2010 
Italy 
(€ million) 
“…on target to be 
EBITDA breakeven, 
before expensed CAC, on 
a month-by-month basis 
from April ” 
“…reported its first full-
year positive EBITDA 
before all CACs…” 
“EBITDA…151 per cent 
better than last year” 
“…achieved a 
breakeven EBITDA 
position for the full 
year” 
“3 Italia’s revenue and 
LBIT…declined 15 per 
cent and increased 16 




“…net loss attributable to 
shareholders of A$552m 
compared to A$410m last 
year…” 
“…net loss attributable to 
shareholders of A$547m, 
a 21 per cent 
improvement …” 
“…revenue from its 3G 
operations of A$849 
million, 76 per cent better 
than in 2005” 
“EBITDA after all 
CACs increased 464 per 
cent for a second year 
of positive EBITDA 
results”
“…revenue of 
A$1623m, a 23 per cent 
increase over the 
previous year and a net 
loss…of A$163m, a 43 
per cent improvement 





“…revenues increased 27 
times…” 
“Total revenue grew 135 
per cent compared to 
2004…”
“…operation in Sweden 
achieved its first full-year 
EBITDA…offset by start-
up losses in Denmark”  
“Combined revenue … 
increased by 48 per cent 
compared to 2006 and 
LBIDTA after all CACs 
reduced by 75 per cent 
as compared to 2006” 
“The combined 
operation achieved a 
major milestone of 
positive EBITDA after 
all CACs … in the 
second half of the year 
…, LBIT for 2008 
improved 29 per cent 
compared to 2007” 
-439 137
Austria
 (€ million)  
“…revenues increased 16 
times…” 
“Total revenue increased 
by 160 per cent compared 
to 2004.” 
“LBITDA before all 
CACs reduced by 82 per 
cent to an almost 
breakeven position” 
“LBITDA after all 
CACs also improved 60 






improved 24 per cent...” 
“…revenue and 
LBIT… increased 3 
per cent and 
reduced 8 per cent 
respectively  
4.1
UK & Ireland 
(£ million) 
- -  “…an 817 per cent 
turnaround from the 
comparable LBITDA last 
year…” 
“3 UK achieved 
positive EBITDA after 
all CACs and before 
including non-recurring 
foreign exchange gains” 
-172 - - 
UK
 (£ million) 
“…achieved earnings  
before EBITDA 
breakeven before 
expensed CAC …in Dec 
2004…”
“First full-year positive 
EBITDA before all 
CACs…”
-- - -89 173
Ireland
(€ million) 
- - - - - - -7831
Note:
1. EBITDA = earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation; LBITDA = loss before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation; CAC = customer acquisition 
costs
Source: Compiled by the authors from the relevant reports of Hutchison Whampoa 32
Table VI  Financial performance of Hutchison Telecommunications International Ltd (2004-2009) and Hutchison Asia Telecommunications (2010) 










4 “…start-up losses of the Vietnam 








LBIT up 17% 
Israel US$176m profit  US$77m profit  US$162m profit  US$244m profit US$277m profit 
6 -
Paraguay - HK$352m  loss
6 -- - - -
Sri Lanka  -












EBITDA after CAC 
HK$57m















1. EBITDA = earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation; LBITDA = loss before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation; CAC = customer acquisition 
costs
2. The reported loss was due to an extraordinary charge of HK$557 million relating to bad debts and customer acquisition costs (Hutchison Whampoa, 2004: 50) 
3. The 2004 Annual Report does not provide specific details regarding the financial performance of the company’s operations in India. It does, however, suggest revenue and 
subscriber growth (Hutchison Whampoa, 2004: 49) 
4. Entered the market in this year 
5. No mention is made of Sri Lanka in the Annual Report (Hutchison Whampoa, 2005)  
6. Exited the market in this year 
7. The 2006 Annual Report does not provide specific details regarding the financial performance in both Ghana and Sri Lanka. Instead, it is noted that in both countries the 
subscriber base increased as network coverage and quality was improved (Hutchison Whampoa, 2006: 50) 
8. The 2010 Annual Report also states that one-off compensation of HK$669 million resulted in a positive EBIT for the year (Hutchison Whampoa, 2010: 49) 
9. Hutchison exited the Thai market in January 2011  
Source: Compiled by the authors from the relevant annual reports of Hutchison WhampoaFigure III Financial performance of the telecommunication businesses in Hong Kong and Macau  
Source: compiled by the authors from the relevant annual reports of Hutchison Whampoa and 
Hutchison Telecommunications Hong Kong Telecommunications. 
33Table VII Financial performance of 3 Group, 2006-2010 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Revenue 
Australia A$m  848.9  1156.4  1467.9  1,884.5  2,201.4 
Austria  €m  172.9 190.4 169.9 174.2 207.3 
Italy  €m  2,071.8 2018.2 1725.6 1647.0  1,705.4 
Sweden & Denmark SEKm  2,632.8  3893.3  4562.3  5,552.2  6,472.9 
UK & Ireland £ m  1,519.6  1590.9  1559.3  1,548.8  -
UK £m  - - - - 1,404.4 
Ireland €m  - - - - 89.9 
Average Revenue Per User per month 
Australia A$m  70.5  68.6 66.5 55.9 54.0
Austria €m  51.2  45.3 33.0 23.9 21.8 
Italy €m  33.9  29.3 25.3 23.5 23.6 
Sweden & Denmark SEKm  404.3  430.8 379.2 347.6 329.0 
UK & Ireland £m  46.57 43.4 33.6 26.5  -
UK £m  - - - - 22.6 
Ireland €m  - - - - 25.4 
Average Revenue Per User per month from non-voice sources % 
Australia A$m  24.0  27.0 31.2 37.0 40.0
Austria €m  18.0  26.0 36.3 49.0 52.0 
Italy €m  35.0  30.0 31.7 39.0 39.0 
Sweden  &  Denmark  SEKm  21.0 27.0 36.3 42.0 43.0 
UK & Ireland £m  29.0  33.0  33.5  37.0  -
UK £m  - - - - 41.0 
Ireland €m  - - - - 55.0 
Source: Compiled by the authors from the relevant annual reports of Hutchison Whampoa 
34Figure IV  Year-on-year service revenue growth rates – ‘3’ compared to country averages, 2004-2010 
Source: Merrill Lynch (2010) 

35